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Where do the limits of experience lie? 
Abandoning the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ features of social reality (and 
between ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ sociological approaches) remains problematic 
within social thought.  Phenomenology is often taken as a paradigmatic example of 
subjectivist sociology, since it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on actors’ 
‘subjective’ interpretations, thereby neglecting ‘objective’ social structures.  
In this article, we question whether phenomenology is usefully understood as falling 
on either side of the standard divides, arguing that phenomenology’s conception of 
‘subjective’ experience of social reality includes many features taken to be ‘objective’ 
elements of it. We illustrate our argument by a critical examination of Jean Lave’s 
attempt to differentiate social practice theory from phenomenology.  We show that 
many theoretical positions that want to overcome the subjective-objective dualism 
retain an objectivist conception of the ‘subjective’ features of social reality.  
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Introduction 
The recent understanding of the history of sociological thought is that for a period it 
was divided over the nature of social life’s most fundamental dimensions. That 
division involved polarised opposition between two separate vocabularies, one made 
up of terms such as ‘structure’, ‘object’, ‘totality’, ‘determinism’, and ‘macro’, whilst 
the other prized ‘agency’, ‘subject’, ‘individual’, ‘spontaneity’, and ‘micro’.  These 
vocabularies were frequently treated as mutually exclusive, i.e., one had to think of 
social reality either according to the first or to the second collection of terms.  As 
Hays (1994, p.57) puts it: 
One of the most prevalent forms of contrast is that between ‘structure and 
agency’. […] this contrast is often mapped onto another set of dichotomies 
common in social theorizing and interpreted to mean, for instance, that 
structure is systematic and patterned, while agency is contingent and 
random; that structure is constraint, while agency is freedom; that 
structure is static, while agency is active; that structure is collective, while 
agency is individual.   
In the sociological literature, the contrast between ‘structure’ versus ‘agency’ is 
perhaps the most prevalent one (cf., Sewell, 1992; Hays, 1994; Alexander, 1995; 
Archer 1995; Bhaskar, 1998; Rubinstein, 2001; King, 2004; Sawyer, 2005). Another 
way of expressing many of these differences is by opposing ‘objectivism’ to 
‘subjectivism’, which will be our concern here.  The following quotation shows the 
supposition that the contrast between individuals and structures can be mapped onto 
divergences amongst sociological positions: 
The split between subjectivism and objectivism has led to two theoretical 
constituencies that rarely account for each other […].  Those scholars who 
focus on the individual, his or her knowledge, actions, intentions or goals, 
leave the nature of the ‘world’ or environment relatively unexplored.  
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Those in the other set emphasise the world and its structures, while 
individuals and social structures are assumed to exist as uniform entities. 
(Osterlund and Carlile, 2005, p.92) 
Osterlund and Carlile reflect an understanding in which objectivism and subjectivism 
are seen as two discontinuous sociological approaches, i.e., as logically and 
empirically independent of each other. Subjectivist approaches (such as, supposedly, 
symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, or ethnomethodology) are seen to focus on 
personal or individual experience and therefore supposedly overlook, neglect, or even 
flatly deny the relevance of macro-structural phenomena to sociological 
understanding. In contrast, objectivist approaches (for example, Marxism, 
functionalism, or critical theory) aim to adopt an external or transcendent viewpoint 
and therefore seem to exclude actors’ personal or individual experience. 
In these discussions, it is important to note that various kinds of levels or questions 
are often mixed up, in particular, ontological (What are the basic units of a 
sociological theory, individual actors or social structures?), epistemological (How can 
social science know reality?), and methodological (How should social science study 
reality, e.g., through ‘subjective’ accounts or ‘objective’ statistics?). In an important 
sense, the difference between subjectivism and objectivism often boils down to the 
question: Is reality represented in individuals’ perceptions or is reality something 
external to them?  
Objectivism assumes that social reality cannot be reduced to subjects’ experience of 
it. Objectivism in sociology does not necessarily employ the appearance/reality 
duality in the Kantian sense of the inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself, but rather 
affiliates the dualism with the understandings and methods of social science. For 
objectivists, it is typically only members of society (subjects) who are restricted to 
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(subjective) appearances, whereas neutral, external, scientific (objective) observers do 
have access to (objective) reality.  According to the objectivist picture, an approach 
like phenomenology is subjectivist, since it takes (subjective) appearances for 
(objective) realities: 
[…] phenomenology is even more radical in its rejection of social 
structures as external and constraining. How the social world appears to 
the individual is the only legitimate topic for the social analyst to study. 
This is the only reality; anything else is an artificial construction of 
sociologists. (Layder, 2006, p. 92; our emphasis) 
Both subjectivism and objectivism have been criticised for their reductionism.  
Consequently, many theorists have questioned the mutual exclusivity of subjectivist 
and objectivist terminologies and have wondered whether a compromise is possible, 
i.e., whether they can be combined in a unified sociological scheme. Among the most 
prominent approaches that have tried to transcend the subjective-objective dualism are 
Bourdieu’s (1977) social practice theory, Giddens’ (1979) structuration theory, and 
Habermas’ (1984/1987) life-world and system scheme.  
In this paper we argue that such attempts at synthesis characteristically retain an 
objectivist position. That is to say, the characterisation of approaches such as 
phenomenology as ‘subjectivist’ presupposes an underlying subjective-objective 
dualism, which phenomenology explicitly aims to overcome. We thus follow recent 
papers by Throop and Murphy (2002) and Endress (2005) who have defended 
phenomenology against the accusation (especially by Bourdieu) of subjectivism.    
Jean Lave’s social practice theory and her study of shopper’s decision-making during 
grocery shopping (e.g., Lave, 1988; Lave et al., 1984; Lave and Wenger, 1991) serves 
as our illustrative example of an integrationist approach, which draws explicitly on 
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Bourdieu and Giddens and their critique of phenomenology as subjectivist (Lave, 
1988, pp.15-18; Lave and Wenger, 1991, p.50). Since her empirical study is based on 
participant observation (following shoppers around in supermarkets) and is therefore 
similar to what phenomenologists might do, this case allows comparison of the 
theoretical, methodological, and practical differences between social practice theory 
and phenomenology. 
Phenomenology’s alleged subjectivism 
Lave’s approach is an example of a widespread tendency to characterise 
phenomenology as ‘subjectivist’. For example, Bunge (1993, pp. 210-211) states: 
Subjectivism is the philosophical view that the world, far from existing on 
its own, is a creation of the knowing subject. […] A clear modern example 
of subjectivism is phenomenology. 
Clegg (1983, p.114) claims that Schutz “developed a radically subjectivist sociology”; 
Martin (2000, p.210) argues that Habermas rejects “the subjectivism of 
phenomenology and ethnomethodology”; Hewitt (2003, p.17) writes that 
“Phenomenological sociology makes the subjective standpoint of individual actors its 
central focus of attention”, which results in a position of “extreme subjectivity” (p. 
19); and Layder (2006) claims that “phenomenology takes a rather more subjective 
stance” (p.92), while “[e]thnmethodology [takes] an even more radically subjective 
approach” (p.103).   
Social theorists frequently take the perceived subjectivism of phenomenology to 
imply that phenomenology denies the existence of ‘objective’ social structures. In 
other words, phenomenology is seen either (a) as claiming that actors are completely 
free to act in, or form interpretations of, the world, or (b) as denying that any features 
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beyond the immediately perceivable here-and-now affect actors’ actions. Thus Bunge 
(1993, p. 211) states that phenomenology and ethnomethodology “focus on 
individuals and deny the real existence of social systems and macrosocial facts”. 
Layder (2006, p.108) claims: 
 […] phenomenology has tended to […] denying the role of structural 
factors beyond the observable and empirical ‘local practices’ that 
constitute the subject matter of social analysis.  Ethnomethodology, in 
particular, has adopted this view, suggesting that it is indifferent to, and 
suspends belief in, institutions, classes, organisations – in short all the 
phenomena associated with structural studies. […] The pose of 
‘indifference’ to any ‘level’ of analysis simply masks a very decided bias 
towards the analysis of micro phenomena and an inability to cope 
analytically with macro phenomena like power, structures and institutions.  
In particular, the notion of constraint in social life is considerably 
underplayed while freedom of choice, the ability to create meaning and to 
pursue purposes are seemingly unhindered by larger structures of 
domination.  
It is phenomenology’s alleged dispensation with the independent reality of social 
structures (and the implication that there is nothing external to the individual will to 
act as a ‘constraint’ on what the will commands) that most puzzles objectivists. We 
think that such a view involves an underestimation of phenomenology and is based on 
the attribution of a double naïveté, first to subjects, then to phenomenologists.   
Objectivists assume, firstly, that subjects are naïve in comparison to sociologists.  
Subjects are seen either as presupposing that their actions are entirely spontaneous, 
making them oblivious to the given sociocultural conditions that form their 
dispositions to act and provide the circumstances which ‘constrain’ their actions. 
Alternatively, subjects are seen as imagining that how they (the subjects) see social 
reality is how it ‘really is’, implying that subjects mistake a particular, situated 
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viewpoint for a comprehensive, complete one.  That is to say, subjects are seen as 
assuming that their momentary situations are the sole reality and are therefore blind to 
the ways in which momentary situations stand in relation to geographically expansive 
and temporally protracted complexes of socioeconomic relationships. Subjects either 
have an implausibly voluntarist conception of their powers and/or fallaciously 
generalise their limited perspectival experience of a miniscule locale to the totality.  
Objectivists not only ascribe these twin forms of naïveté to subjects, but argue, 
secondly, that phenomenologists are naïve in accepting subjects’ subjectivity as their 
(the phenomenologists’) guide to the nature of social reality.  In the eyes of 
objectivists, since phenomenology starts and remains with subjects’ experiences of 
the social world, phenomenology will be unable to avoid adopting subjects’ naïve 
focus on their respective ‘here-and-nows’ and will have to neglect all imposed, 
predetermining, and restricting conditions. A possible base for attributing this second 
naïveté can be found in Schutz, who insists that  
[…] the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the 
second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on 
the social scene, whose behaviour the social scientist has to observe and to 
explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (Schutz, 
1962, p.59) 
Schutz argues that social scientists have to start with actors’ interpretations of the 
social world, which for objectivists seems not only a serious restriction for social 
science, but in fact condemns social science to subjectivism, substituting actors’ 
subjectivist interpretation for social reality. 
Page 9 of 35 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). Where do the limits of experience lie? Abandoning the 
dualism of objectivity and subjectivity. History of the Human Sciences 21 (3), 70-93.  
 
For example, Bourdieu, who has been particularly influential in characterising 
phenomenology as subjectivist, critiques Sartre’s supposedly subjectivist 
phenomenological approach thus1: 
If the world of action is nothing other than this universe of interchangeable 
possibles, entirely dependent on the decrees of the consciousness which 
creates it and hence totally devoid of objectivity, if it is moving because 
the subject chooses to be moved, revolving because he chooses to be 
revolted, then emotions, passions, and actions are merely games of bad 
faith, sad farces in which one is both bad actor and good audience […]. 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p.74; emphasis in original)2 
For Jenkins (1992, p.17) this shows that Bourdieu wants to argue that there is “more 
to social life than the subjective consciousness of the actors who move within it and 
produce it.  There is, if you like, an objective social reality beyond the immediate 
interactional sphere and the self-conscious awareness of individuals.” Bourdieu 
argues that social scientists must not pursue a subjectivist approach, but also seems to 
suggest that subjects themselves are subjectivist in this way. Thus Bourdieu goes on 
to quote from Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method: 
It is because the imaginary offers the mind no resistance that the mind, 
conscious of no restraint, gives itself up to boundless ambitions and 
believes it possible to construct, or rather reconstruct, the world by virtue 
of its own strength and at the whim of its desires.  
                                                 
1 See Harcourt (2006) for a more recent critique of phenomenology along Bourdieu’s line.  
2 When evaluating Bourdieu’s, as well as Harcourt’s (2006), characterisation of Sartre it is important to 
bear in mind that although Sartre uses the term ‘subjective’, this does not necessarily imply that Sartre 
supposes that individuals can do whatever they want, only – to put it very crudely – that they have the 
power to say ‘no’ to situational pressures to act in bad faith. 
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Here Bourdieu seems to imply that Sartre’s doctrine, while wrong as a starting point 
for social science, nevertheless correctly portrays subjects’ subjectivity, i.e., captures 
subjects’ naïve conviction that they are free to act however they will.  Bourdieu does 
not challenge that part of Sartre’s doctrines, but criticises Sartre for appropriating that 
naïve standpoint as his theoretical one, infringing Bourdieu’s maxim that:  
One is entitled to undertake to give an ‘account of accounts’, so long as 
one does not put forward one’s contribution to the science of pre-scientific 
representation of the social world as if it were a science of the social 
world. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 21) 
The core of our argument can thus be given as a summation of these themes: 
objectivists believe, firstly, that subjects are subjectivist; and, secondly, that 
phenomenology necessarily acquiesces in subjects’ subjectivism. Phenomenology’s 
denial of subjectivism puzzles objectivists: “Aren’t you saying that you are taking 
actors’ perspectives seriously? Well, if they are subjectivist, then so must you be!”  
However: Are subjects ‘subjectivist’ as envisioned by objectivists – or is this only an 
artefact created by overburdening the characterisation of subjectivity with objectivist 
preconceptions? Objectivists imagine that phenomenology quarrels with objectivists’ 
characterisation of phenomenology, whereas the real quarrel is with objectivists’ 
treatment of subjects.  Thus in our view neither subjects nor phenomenologists are 
subjective in the sense outlined.    
As mentioned, Throop and Murphy (2002) and Endress (2005) also criticise 
Bourdieu’s characterisation of phenomenology and defend phenomenology at the 
level of doctrine. Both articles point out that Bourdieu exaggerates the differences 
between his own theory and phenomenology and document that propositions which 
Bourdieu insists must be constitutionally absent from phenomenology are explicitly 
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present there.  This is a correct reaction against the second form of naïveté described 
above, whilst our strategy is to cast doubt also on the first.  
We have used the term ‘phenomenology’ rather indiscriminatingly so far, possibly 
implying that phenomenology is a single, coherent approach.  Throop and Murphy 
(2002, p.189) criticise Bourdieu for his overly inclusive use of the term 
‘phenomenology’ and we might seem open to a tu quoque.  
Phenomenology is typically taken to originate with Edmund Husserl (1931, 1970) 
who had an immense influence on, inter alia, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (see 
Spiegelberg, 1960).  For the social sciences, the works of Aron Gurwitsch (1964) and 
Alfred Schutz (1962, 1964, 1966) have been particularly important.  Schutz’s work 
consisted in the application of some of Husserl’s policies in the preparation of a 
philosophical prologue to a sociology of social action and has been popularised in the 
social sciences by Berger and Luckman’s (1966) The Social Construction of Reality, 
while Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology involved a complex 
transformation of Schutz (and others) into an empirical sociological approach.  While 
these authors share some similarities (most importantly an indebtedness to Husserl), 
they are clearly not part of a unified project.  However, within the social sciences, the 
differences between them are often ignored, i.e., ‘phenomenology’ often functions as 
a gloss for all of them (and sometimes might even include references to symbolic 
interactionism or Goffman). In particular, there is typically no distinction made 
between Husserl’s phenomenology, Schutz’s (social) phenomenology, and 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1977, p.3; Bunge, 1993, pp. 210-
212; Martin, 2000, p.210; Layder, 2006, pp. 106-109).  Since in this paper we are only 
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interested in the implied subjectivism of, e.g., Schutz’s phenomenology or Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology, we use the term ‘phenomenology’ in a similar way.  
Phenomenology’s complaint  
As just explained, we are critical of the portrayal of phenomenology as subjectivist, a 
portrayal which plays such an important part in the manufacture of an ‘integrationist’ 
problem for sociological theory.  It is striking, however, that this view is not only 
common among objectivists, but also among those approaches that are not wholly 
unsympathetic to phenomenology’s objectives and, in particular, agree with 
phenomenology’s critique of some forms of objectivism. Such approaches include, for 
example, activity theory (Engeström, 1999, 2001), social practice theory (Schatzki et 
al., 2001, Chaiklin and Lave, 1993), or situated learning theory (Lave and Wenger, 
1991). While seeing some promise in phenomenology, these approaches argue that 
phenomenology’s contribution to sociological analysis can only be partial, since there 
are aspects of the social world that are beyond phenomenology’s reach. Consequently, 
phenomenology cannot stand alone, but must be supplemented by some historical, 
structural, or other account. Phenomenology enables some valid objections to 
objectivism but goes too far. Such approaches agree with Bourdieu that the opposition 
of objectivity and subjectivity is a key dualism that sociology must confront. 
Objectivist sociology wrongly focused only on ‘objective’ features of social reality 
and phenomenology appropriately corrected this.  However, phenomenology 
overreacted, moving away from objectivity to focus entirely on subjectivity. 
We quoted Layder (2006, p. 92) who argued that “phenomenology is even more 
radical in its rejection of social structures as external and constraining”. Layder is 
correct in thinking that phenomenology is radical, but not in the sense that it moves 
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from social structures to individual agency, but in the sense that it collapses the 
distinction. Phenomenology does not simply change the focus of study, but rather 
makes the original dichotomy superfluous. Within the objectivist tradition (and its 
dualist successors) it is assumed that the properties that an object possesses 
‘objectively’ and the properties of the object ‘subjectively’ perceived are 
discontinuous.  In contrast, phenomenology argues that the disjunction is an artefact 
of the fact that the object-as-perceived is only portrayed in a superficial and partial 
manner.  Giving up the initial dualism results in a more scrupulous portrayal of 
experience, including the ‘objective’ features inherent in experience.  In Kantian 
terms: objectivists accept a fundamental difference between the ‘objective’ object-in-
itself and the ‘subjective’ object-in-experience.  Phenomenology does not restrict 
itself to the study of only one of two possible objects (the object-in-itself or the 
object-in-experience), but rather questions the duplication. For phenomenology there 
is one object, not two, and that is the object-in-experience (cf., Garfinkel, 1952, pp. 
95-97), where that object-in-experience has the essential features objectivists ascribe 
to the object-in-itself3. This means that resolutely faithful portrayal of the ‘subjective’ 
is equally resolute and faithful in portraying the ‘objective’.  
This is perhaps more easily appreciated, if it is realised that the designation of the 
object-in-experience is not a locative. It therefore does not involve an ontological 
relocation, transporting, e.g., the ‘objective’ chair in the corner of the room to a new 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Garfinkel (2002), where ethnomethodology is characterised as a translation of the 
properties of Durkheim’s social facts into practically produced organisational features of everyday 
phenomena (see also Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, forthcoming b). 
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site inside an individual’s head or into the realm of ideas.  From the perspective of 
phenomenology, ‘objective’ properties of the chair (for example, that it remains in 
place and does not change its form whether or not I am present in the room), is not 
something that is only available to sociologists, but is part of the way the chair is 
experienced by actors. Schutz’s famous example of the house (1962, p. 108) was used 
to point out that our experience of the house is not restricted to what is currently in 
our visual field. 
In an early paper, Bittner (1973) resisted the characterisation of phenomenology as 
subjectivist, since such a characterisation leads to an ‘aborted’ phenomenology, one 
that would remain caught in the subjective-objective dualism it aims to overcome. 
Bittner argued that although phenomenology investigates subjects’ experience of the 
world, this experience is not construed to be purely ‘subjective’, since it includes 
many references to an ‘objective’ social world (which phenomenologists sometimes 
try to express by speaking of ‘the intentionality of consciousness’).   Bittner pointed 
out that Schutz’s analysis begins from ‘the world of everyday life’, and that Schutz  
emphasises that an important feature of the world of everyday life is precisely that it 
is experienced as spatially and temporally extended4. Schutz argues that subjects’ 
experiences, while the starting point for a social science of action, are not solipsist in 
nature, but include references to an external social world that is experienced as shared 
                                                 
4 Objectivists often suppose that the concept of ‘totality’ is indispensable to sociological thought, but 
this is perhaps because they think that the object of inquiry is ‘the society’ (often equivalent to the 
nation-state), which might be amenable to ‘totalising’, but whilst ‘the world of everyday life’ features 
some large-scale organisations (the nation-state itself among them), it does not seem amenable to the 
kind of synoptic totalisation that objectivists envisage. 
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with others (who are known predominantly through typicality and with varying 
degrees of specificity and determinacy). As Bittner (1973, p.120) puts it:  
[i]t is impossible to overestimate the centrality of the subject for the 
phenomenal constitution of the world of everyday life. But while I am 
undeniably the center, the ‘null-point’, toward which the world of 
everyday life is structured, I recognize within this world, through the 
office of the general thesis of the alter ego, you, him, them, all ‘null-
points’ in their own rights.  And so the world of everyday life is above all 
our home in which we live, in some ways identically, similarly, jointly, 
reciprocally, according to arrangements some of which we claim to have 
authored whereas others appear to belong to preexisting realities. 
Bittner is aware of the danger that his view could be characterised as subjectivist.  He 
provides the following warning: 
To say that the world of everyday life is organized relative to the 
perceiving subject seems to imply that its meaning structures are freely 
determined at this ‘null-point’. To counteract this possible implication it 
will be worthwhile to draw attention to the ways in which the factual 
reality of the world actually impresses its hold on the subject. 
First, I, the perceiving subject who faces the world knowingly, know that 
as an object among objects I enjoy no special privilege. I come into being, 
endure and perish as a thing among things and even if I have it within me 
to look forward to redemption, it will not be in this world.  However much 
I may have taken charge of my own life, the bare fact of my existence is 
just that, a fact over which I have no control. […] 
Second, despite the fact that I have (together with the rest of mankind, of 
course) an enormous span of control over the world surrounding me […], 
it remains a melancholy truth that the world as a whole will always have 
its way with me, in the long run. […] What else is folly if not the neglect 
of or oblivion to the intractabilities of the world? (p. 120; our emphases) 
Bittner gives voice to the phenomenological view that the experience of the world 
begins with the subject.  However, Bittner points out that this leaves in place the fact 
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that the world “impresses its hold on the subject” and that there are many aspects over 
which one has no control. Bittner resists precisely the two forms of naïveté outlined. 
Both subjects and phenomenologists are aware of ‘objective’ features in experience 
and aware that the experienced world is predominantly not under the control of the 
subject. What makes Bourdieu-type conceptions ‘abortive’ for Bittner is that they 
delete the central task of phenomenology’s inquiries, which does not turn attention 
inward to ‘the subject’, but seeks faithfulness to ‘the objects’ that are found in 
experience, a procedure which if conducted effectively does not deprive ‘objects’ of 
their objective character, but achieves an appreciation of how objectivity is present in 
experience.   
An illustrative case 
We will try to clarify some of the issues by focussing on an example, the work of Jean 
Lave, who takes pains to distance her ‘integrationist’ social practice theory from 
phenomenology and who indicates general approval of Bourdieu’s position in these 
matters (Lave, 1988, pp.15-18; Lave and Wenger, 1991, p.50).   
Lave’s famous study was the Adult Math Project (e.g., Lave, 1986, 1988, 1993; Lave 
et al., 1984, 1989; de la Rocha, 1985, 1986; Murtaugh, 1985a,b), in which arithmetic 
practices were studied in everyday situations, including, supermarket shopping, 
dieting, and cooking. Methodologically, the approach of the supermarket study was 
participant observation: 
[…] we followed participants at times when they fit shopping into their 
schedules (any hour of the day or night).  We arrived at the house in time 
to observe preparations for shopping, went to the store together, shopped, 
and returned home to follow the process of storing groceries as the 
expedition ended in their kitchens. (Lave, 1988, p.49) 
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The data were obtained through participant observation.  Before entering 
the supermarket, shoppers strapped a tape recorder over their shoulder and 
were asked to ‘think aloud’ while proceeding through the store, because 
the two anthropologists accompanying them were interested in learning 
about their shopping procedures, whatever they might be.  As a shopper 
walked through the store, one researcher maintained a running 
conversation with the shopper. (Lave et al., 1984, p.69) 
Like Suchman (1987), Lave offered a consequential critique of formalistic and 
cognitivistic conceptions of cognition and learning, emphasising their practical and 
situated nature (viz. the title of her book, Cognition in Practice). The aim of the 
supermarket study was to demonstrate that arithmetic practices rather than ‘driving’ 
shopping decisions, were shaped by them: “Arithmetic problematic-solving is thus 
[…] strongly shaped in form, outcome, and meaning by the broader scope of activity 
and setting within which it occurs” (Lave et al., 1984, p.68).  
We find Lave’s interpretations of the Adult Math Project’s case studies questionable 
(see Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, forthcoming a), but the interest here is in how Lave 
frames the case studies within a social practice theory. The emphasis on the practical 
and situated nature of activities might have suggested affinity with phenomenology 
and ethnomethodology, but Lave is anxious to minimise this: 
The characteristic focus of practice theory on individuals in activity in 
social interaction suggests strong ties with ethnomethodological or other 
phenomenologically-based theories. But practice theory focuses on 
everyday activity in human-scale institutional realizations of sociocultural 
order. Principles of production and political organization are incorporated 
through the analysis of how they present themselves to the experience of 
individuals in the arenas of everyday action in the world.  Practice theory, 
which treats macrostructural systems as fundamental, and focuses on 
relations between structure and action, is thus not to be confused with a 
phenomenological view, which treats social systems as (only) 
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epiphenomena of intersubjectively constituted experience. That both focus 
analysis on the details of everyday practice should not obscure the 
essential difference between them (Lave, 1988, p. 193, endnote 7). 
Further:  
The phenomenological position enjoys continuity between socially 
relating individuals and the society they interactively construct.  But 
correspondingly, it is unable to account for macro-social, political-
economic structures which, it appears, individuals can neither create nor 
negotiate directly but which somehow contribute to the public aspect of 
specific contexts. [Phenomenology] has […] experience without system. 
(Lave, 1988, p.150) 
In these quotations we find the view outlined above: a perceived fundamental contrast 
between, on the one hand, “principles of production and political organization” (i.e., 
objective social structures), and, on the other, “the experience of individuals” (i.e., 
subjective agency).  Since phenomenology focuses only on the latter, “it is unable to 
account for macro-social, political-economic structures”. 
The attribution of naïveté  
According to Lave, both social practice theory and phenomenology focus on 
“individuals in activity”, taking seriously individuals’ experience of the situation. 
However, phenomenology looks at this alone and therefore must neglect social 
structures that influence this experience. In contrast, social practice theory focuses on 
“macrostructural systems” and investigates relations between these and subjects’ 
experience of them. Phenomenologists are thus seen as naïve vis-à-vis social practice 
theorists, since they ignore macro-social structures. Phenomenology is not mistaken to 
pay attention to individuals’ experiences (this it shares with social practice theory), 
but is wrong to do so at the expense of social structures. Social practice theory, whilst 
also focussing on individuals, does not make this mistake.   
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Lave exhibits the aforementioned objectivist conception of experience, understood as 
limited to the here-and-now with an implied distinction between “principles of 
production and political organisation” in themselves, and how these “present 
themselves to the experience of individuals”. There is therefore also the naïveté of 
individuals vis-à-vis analysts, where only the latter have ‘objective’ access to 
“principles of production and political organization”.  In other words, it is not just 
phenomenologists, but also subjects, who do not see the ‘objective’ features of the 
situation. This can briefly be illustrated by Lave’s description of the nature of choices 
to be made during a shopping trip: 
The supermarket is thought of by consumers as a locus of abundant 
choices, for which the stock of thousands of items constitutes apparent 
evidence. But contradicting this view is a different order of circumstances: 
the shopper cannot provide food for the family if he leaves the 
supermarket empty-handed, due to attacks of indecision.  That is, the 
shopper, faced with abundant alternatives, nonetheless cannot avoid 
making choices.  Conversely, because the making of choices cannot be 
avoided, it is to the seller’s advantage to proliferate decision criteria in the 
shopping setting.  This contributes to the shopper’s experience of 
abundant choices, helping to maintain the contradiction between choice 
and the necessity of choosing. This contradiction is not itself generally 
recognized, much less viewed as problematic, by shoppers.    (Lave et al., 
1984, pp.79-80; our emphases) 
Here a contrast is made between the appearance of the benefits of “abundant choices”, 
which supposedly stands in contradiction to the necessity of “making choices”. The 
described situation seems obvious enough: on the one hand, it is nice that when 
buying a particular kind of product (e.g., yoghurt), shoppers have a few alternatives to 
choose from.  On the other hand, shoppers may wish to minimise the time spent 
shopping, so the availability of alternatives can be seen to complicate the shopping 
process. However, note that Lave attributes naïveté to shoppers, since she argues that 
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this ‘contradiction’ “is not itself generally recognized […] by shoppers” (though 
known to the analyst). Since shoppers are limited to (subjective) experiences of the 
supermarket, they do not see these (objective) aspects of it.    
Lave also distinguishes between the perspective of shoppers and the perspective of 
sellers. That, again, seems an obvious point: what shoppers ‘want’ from the 
supermarket is different from what sellers ‘want’ from the supermarket.  We might 
even say that these wants stand, in a certain sense, in contradiction to each other 
(shoppers want to pay as little as possible, whereas sellers want to charge the highest 
price).  In that sense, shoppers’ and sellers’ experiences of supermarkets differ.   Lave 
may think that it is this difference that is unrecognized as problematic by shoppers 
(and phenomenologists). In contrast, we argue that shoppers understand this. For 
example, if the supermarket increases the price of an item, shoppers’ experience 
includes the ‘conflict’ between their and the supermarkets’ needs. Shoppers 
appreciate the ‘contradiction’ observed by social practice theory (and consequently, 
so can phenomenologists).  
In sum, Lave asserts the superiority of social practice theory over both 
phenomenology and the experience of subjects themselves.  However, this superiority 
is based on the ascription of naïveté to both phenomenologists and shoppers, where 
this ascription is not the result of the analysis, but an a priori overruling.  
The durable and non-negotiable character of social structures 
This is further illustrated by Lave’s characterisation of what seems to objectivists the 
most fundamental aspect of social structures: their durability and non-negotiability.  
While (subjective) experiences are seen as fleeting, short-lived, and malleable, 
(objective) structures are seen as persistent, enduring, and immutable. It is the 
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resulting ‘constraint’ of objective structures on subjective experience that 
phenomenology supposedly ignores or cannot account for. Whilst the experience of 
the supermarket as part of the shopping trip is transient, the supermarket ‘in itself’ 
remains before and after the shoppers’ presence there.  Furthermore, while shoppers 
may ‘negotiate’ their experience of the supermarket, the supermarket ‘in itself’ cannot 
be (directly) influenced by shoppers: 
Certain aspects of behavior settings have durable and public properties.  
The supermarket is such a durable entity – a physically, economically, 
politically, and socially organized space-in-time.  In this aspect it may be 
called an ‘arena’ within which activity takes place.  The supermarket as 
arena is the product of patterns of capital formation and political economy.  
It is not negotiable directly by the individual. It is outside of, yet 
encompasses the individual, providing a higher-order institutional 
framework within which the setting is constituted.  At the same time, for 
individual shoppers the supermarket is a repeatedly experienced, 
personally ordered and edited version of the arena.  In this aspect it may be 
termed a ‘setting’ for activity.  Some aisles in the supermarket do not exist 
for a given shopper as part of his setting, while other aisles are 
multifeatured areas to the shopper who routinely seeks a particular 
familiar product. (Lave et al., 1984, p.71; our emphases) 
Lave argues for a difference between the supermarket seen ‘subjectively’ (as 
‘setting’) and ‘objectively’ (as ‘arena’).   This illustrates that objectivists assume that 
the properties that an object possesses ‘objectively’ and the properties of the object 
‘subjectively’ experienced are discontinuous, as Lave assumes a fundamental 
difference between the supermarket’s durable, standardised, impersonal, and public 
properties with the ways it is experienced as part of individuals’ personally ordered 
shopping trajectories.   
Page 22 of 35 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). Where do the limits of experience lie? Abandoning the 
dualism of objectivity and subjectivity. History of the Human Sciences 21 (3), 70-93.  
 
Note that Lave’s description of supermarkets seems to consist of two relatively 
unremarkable Durkheim-style points. Firstly, the supermarket business involves a 
large plurality of participating individuals, both of the same category (different 
shoppers) and of different categories (e.g., shoppers and sellers).  Therefore the 
supermarket cannot be reduced to the experience and activities of any single one of 
those.  In other words, the object ‘the supermarket’ is not identical with any one 
individual’s singular or repeating experience and in that sense exists externally to 
individuals’ personal experience.  
Secondly, the object ‘the supermarket’ is not controllable by single individuals, or at 
least only marginally so.  That is, the nature of the supermarket imposes itself on the 
shopper’s experience rather than the other way around. The shopper is powerless to 
affect the overall organisation of the supermarket company, must mostly comply with 
the corporate requirements as to the form of shopping procedures, and individually 
can engender only the most insignificant of effects upon the corporately formatted 
layout and functions of the shop’s floor.  
For Lave these observations seem to be important, presumably because she feels that 
phenomenologists (or shoppers) might deny them. In contrast, we see these 
observations as uncontroversial, i.e., would argue that both shoppers and 
phenomenologists are aware of them. In particular, phenomenology does not deny 
that the supermarket “is not negotiable directly by the individual”, but argues that the 
difference between the ‘negotiable’ and the ‘non-negotiable’ is made within 
experience (and inherent, so to speak, in the structure of action, or, to highlight just 
this feature, of action conceived as practical). In other words, a non-aborted 
conception of experience subsumes both of Lave’s observations.   
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Three points follow: Firstly, those aspects of supermarkets that Lave labels “a non-
negotiable concrete realization of a political economy” are not available to 
phenomenology through a study of shoppers’ experience, but that does not mean that 
phenomenology could not capture these by studying other individuals (e.g., managers, 
architects, engineers, marketing people, etc.). 
Secondly, many of the ‘non-negotiable’ aspects of supermarkets are nevertheless 
available to shoppers, especially if they take an interest in them. In other words, these 
features may be beyond (direct) ‘control’, but not beyond ‘intelligibility’. Even if you 
haven’t studied supermarkets, you are probably aware of taken-for-granted 
understandings of supermarkets, such as that they strive to make profits, that products 
are arranged to prompt impulsive purchasing, or that products are placed in prominent 
positions as ‘loss leaders’. 
Thirdly, although these aspects may be beyond immediate and direct control of 
individual shoppers, they are not necessarily completely beyond their influence. In 
other words, in Lave’s claim that these aspects are “not negotiable directly by the 
individual”, there is no specification of the extent to which they are non-negotiable, 
i.e., over what time span, in relation to what other activities and concerns, and through 
what co-ordination with others5. Complaining to the manager about the danger to 
children of a given product’s placement might occasion immediate re-arrangement of 
the store floor, just as threatening litigation on the basis of some candidate negligence 
                                                 
5 As King (1999, p. 221) notes: “Thus, although it is true that ‘I’ as an individual can do practically 
nothing and that material conditions seem glacial to me, it is not true that these conditions are 
independent of everybody and that everybody can do nothing.” 
Page 24 of 35 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). Where do the limits of experience lie? Abandoning the 
dualism of objectivity and subjectivity. History of the Human Sciences 21 (3), 70-93.  
 
can occasion instant relaxations of corporate policies. Participating in publicised 
boycotts or signing consumer-lobby petitions are, of course, projects with longer-term 
effects (aimed at modifying supermarket policies) and are thus not to be accomplished 
during today’s shopping trip (and it is in terms of the latter that we are being invited 
to identify ‘the arena’ that is the supermarket).  
The very question of what features of the supermarket count as ‘negotiable’ thus 
depends on which individuals, projects, circumstances and time spans we are talking 
about. Things that are inflexible givens for a brief shopping trip are not necessarily 
such in the context of commitment to a collective project of boycotting supermarket 
goods and protesting locations. Lave sees the difference in negotiability in ontological 
terms, resulting in a difference between the supermarket as ‘setting’ and as ‘arena’, 
where the former is available to shoppers and the latter to sociologists.  In contrast, 
we have been arguing that the difference in negotiability lies in the nature of the 
practical tasks and associated means involved (for example, between making day-to-
day purchasing selections in the light of one’s domestic circumstances and 
participating in collective activities aimed at confounding corporate management).  
These differences do not reflect differences between actors and sociologists, but 
between different kinds of actors engaged in different kinds of activities.  
Methodological or literary differences? 
We had mentioned above that social practice theory, whilst sharing with 
phenomenology a focus on individuals, thinks that it can avoid phenomenology’s 
mistake of doing so at the expense of social structures. This raises the question: How 
does social practice theory (or other approaches that are dismissive of 
phenomenology) achieve this? 
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Sometimes the differences between objectivist and subjectivist sociological 
approaches are framed in terms of different methods of empirical investigations and 
resultant data.  For example, those who argue for a primacy of social structures often 
emphasize the importance of surveys or other representations of large and distributed 
populations, while thus focusing on agency may prefer participant observation of a 
few specific individuals. However, the differences between Lave’s social practice 
theory and phenomenology are not based on methodological differences of this kind. 
Lave’s study of supermarkets is conducted through participant observation featuring 
in situ interviews with shoppers, which is hardly different from materials that 
phenomenologists could – indeed did (see Hester and Francis, 2003) – assemble.  
This raises the question: How does Lave access objective social structures in a way 
which differs from that in which anyone or phenomenologists might do?    She argues 
that social practice theory “treats macrostructural systems as fundamental, and 
focuses on relations between structures and action” (Lave, 1988, p. 193, endnote 7).  
However, what method does Lave have to access and identify “macrostructural 
systems” in themselves? In particular, are these methods different from those that 
individuals (shoppers, sellers, etc.) use to attend to them? If the supermarket’s 
structure is not directly findable by individuals, how is Lave able to locate the 
properties she invokes? 
Lave does not directly answer these questions. However, since she does not provide 
any substantial or systematic data on the arena-structure of supermarkets, it seems 
most likely that the supermarket as ‘arena’ (that is contrasted with the supermarket as 
‘setting’) in Lave’s argument must itself be constructed from common-sense 
understandings. In other words, Lave’s appeals to ‘supermarkets’ do not evidence 
Page 26 of 35 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). Where do the limits of experience lie? Abandoning the 
dualism of objectivity and subjectivity. History of the Human Sciences 21 (3), 70-93.  
 
previously undocumented data, but are presented as reasonable and recognisable 
everyday claims about ‘what supermarkets are really like’ (that are plausible 
independently of any research documentation). Lave’s supermarket as ‘arena’ is 
neither more nor less than the-supermarket-that-everyone-knows6, stereotypically 
known as organised to make profits, maximise sales, surreptitiously stimulate 
consumer expenditure, and so on. For example, when Lave (1986, p.95) writes that: 
The store has won many of the agonistic struggles for the cultural 
formulation of supermarket arenas – most information considered vital to 
shoppers is in very small print; prices are given as prime numbers, making 
calculation difficult; a whole series of strategies in placing and pricing 
products are notoriously favourable to management in the war between 
store and shoppers. 
This observation is no summary of ‘investigative journalism’, where a reporter or 
researcher might present the reader with possibly novel revelations, but rather draws 
on knowledge shared with readers. Lave takes for granted readers’ agreement that the 
store (management) is motivated by ‘capitalist’ rather than ‘altruistic’ concerns, and 
that the store is ‘against’ rather than ‘for’ shoppers7. 
                                                 
6 As Sacks (1975) explained, ‘everyone’ is an indexical.  
7 This is further subversive of the dualism of objective structures and subjective experience, for it 
shows that ‘social reality’ is not two objects, differentially known to sociologists and members of 
society, but one object, the world of daily life, known under two (partially) distinct forms of practice. It 
seems to us that the sociologist’s and members’ actual relationship to the world of daily life (as 
opposed to the programmatically idealised one) is not between ‘expert’ and ‘person in the street’ (to 
borrow Schutz’s scheme for the social distribution of knowledge), since what sociologists do 
(especially in an age of critical theory) is much closer to the practice of ‘the well informed citizen’.  In 
this paper we indicate how Lave’s grasp of the empirical organisation of supermarkets is not based in 
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Lave’s rhetorical contrast with phenomenology proposes an ontological difference 
between structure and agency and a difference between sociologists and actors, 
whereas we would argue that these differences are achieved through literary tropes. 
Lave’s treatment of her supermarket materials resembles what Burke (1945, pp. 77-
90) has identified as ‘changing the circumference’, which consists of redefining the 
setting against which an action is portrayed in order to change the sense of that action. 
For example, rather than viewing a visit to the supermarket against the background of 
daily chores (its place in the round of housework, getting kids to school, etc.), it is re-
imagined against the capitalist system as a totality (therefore portraying the trip to the 
supermarket as an externally necessity imposed by capitalism).  By this change in 
perspective, shoppers’ understandings of their supermarket visits are transformed into 
misunderstandings, since their characterisations of the shopping trip conflict with 
those of the analyst. However, the source of shoppers’ ‘misunderstandings’ is not 
their subjectivity (and the implied objectivity of the analyst), but rather a result of the 
fact that the analyst has reframed the relevances against which shoppers’ descriptions 
have to be understood.  For example, witness how Lave deals with shoppers’ 
characterisation of the shopping trip as ‘routine’: 
Shoppers describe themselves as engaged in a routine chore, making 
habitual purchases.  But their description must be addressed as data, not as 
part of the analysis. ‘Habit’ and ‘routine’ should be treated not as 
empirical descriptions of repeated episodes of the same activity in the 
                                                                                                                                            
technical expertise of the political economy or operating structures of corporate supermarket chains, 
but in something like a consumer activist’s ‘well informed’ grasp of contemporary public issues 
concerning supermarkets. 
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same setting but as statements of an ideological order. (Lave et al., 1984, 
p.77)  
Through talking to shoppers before, during, and after their trip to the supermarket, 
Lave finds out that shoppers describe their shopping as ‘routine’, which is seen as 
evidence that shoppers experience the shopping trip as routine or habitual. Following 
Bourdieu’s maxim to be dissatisfied with first-order descriptions, Lave wants to ask: 
Is the shopping trip really (objectively speaking) the way it is experienced? 
As mentioned, Lave’s overall targets are cognitive science conceptions of ‘rationality’ 
and ‘problem solving’. For Lave, such theories conceive of calculation in terms of 
“mechanical reproduction” (Lave et al., 1984, p.77), e.g., see calculation as an 
entirely thoughtless activity (that could be done by a computer).  In response, Lave 
holds that shopping does involve complex problem solving and decision making (e.g., 
when and where to calculate or choosing situation-specific means for calculation) and 
consequently should not be characterised as ‘routine’.  
Lave correctly rejects simplistic conceptions of rationality. However, she uses these 
theories to evaluate shoppers’ descriptions of their shopping trip. For Lave, shoppers’ 
characterisation of the shopping trip as ‘routine’ shows that they accept the cognitivist 
conception of rationality. It must therefore be a “statement of an ideological order” 
and demonstrates that shoppers have ‘internalised’ the cognitivist ideology of 
rationality (cf., Lave, 1993, pp. 29-30; see Lynch, 1995, pp. 588-589).  However, it is 
only by altering the circumference of ‘routine’ to cognitivist theories that Lave is 
forced to see shoppers as naïve. If we choose the circumference as ‘other activities 
that we engage in’, then there are good reasons why the shopping trip should be 
characterised thus: going to the supermarket to buy groceries is done frequently and 
often in standardised ways, making it more ‘routine’ than other activities, such as 
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buying a house or planning a holiday, which occur infrequently and may involve more 
complications. 
Lave’s strategy of ‘changing the circumference’ enables a final point with respect to 
the relationship of first- and second-order descriptions.  As Lave demonstrates, social 
practice theory does not want to ignore individuals’ (first-order) descriptions, but 
“their description[s] must be addressed as data, not as part of the analysis”.  In other 
words, Lave agrees with Bourdieu’s maxim (already quoted) that 
One is entitled to undertake to give an ‘account of accounts’, so long as 
one does not put forward one’s contribution to the science of pre-scientific 
representation of the social world as if it were a science of the social 
world. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 21) 
Lave follows Bourdieu in her treatment of concepts such as ‘choice’, ‘negotiability’, 
or ‘routineness’. Although she sees promise in talking to subjects, she does not want 
to take what subjects say at face value, since she assumes there to be a fundamental 
difference between (first-order) ‘pre-scientific’ and ‘scientific’ representations of the 
social world. For Lave, since phenomenology only focuses on subjects’ pre-scientific 
understandings, it cannot achieve a scientific one8.   
                                                 
8 First-order understandings extensively feature typifications which can be more or less vague, detailed 
and anonymous. This carries an implication that ethnomethodology, rather more than Schutz, 
elaborates: a great deal of professional sociological reasoning does not use second-order constructs 
alone, but deploys these in conjunction with formally unacknowledged first-order typifications (which 
Bittner [1965] calls ‘auxiliaries’). Categories like ‘woman’, ‘adult’, ‘employee’, ‘manager’, 
‘supermarket’, etc. are first-order constructs, not second-order ones (see also Rose, 1960).  Lave writes 
as if she was making reference to a set of well-developed sociological constructs – ‘theories of capital 
formation’, ‘organizational development’, etc. – but she mostly operates in terms of first-order ones. 
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We have argued that a comparison of (first-order) ‘pre-scientific’ with ‘scientific’ 
representations can only be effective if the character of the former is faithfully 
rendered. We have tried to demonstrate that the difference between the pre-scientific 
‘setting’ and the allegedly scientific ‘arena’ neither consists in the availability of more 
data nor is it derived from methods available uniquely to professional researchers, but 
rather depends upon disregarding those relevancies that might make the shoppers’ 
assessments of their grocery shopping experience both cogent and apt in favour of 
theorist-imposed standards of relevance. Lave counters an extreme form of 
cognitivism that insists that all activities are matters of mechanical routine by arguing 
that no activities are routine. Whilst shoppers’ shopping practices can thus serve 
Lave’s counter-cognitivist argument (since they can be seen as complex and non-
mechanical), shoppers’ experience of what they are doing as routine stands in conflict 
to Lave’s characterisation of it. Despite officially aiming to vindicate the competence 
and sophistication of ‘just plain folks’, Lave actually treats shoppers as naïve about 
their own experience, but does so by disregarding evidence that the cognitivists’ 
conceptions are not those shoppers themselves have in mind.   
In sum, the ‘inadequacy’ of (first-order) ‘pre-scientific’ representations is not usually 
determined by reference to the representational roles that such constructs play in their 
home environment, the world of everyday life and its practical affairs, but through 
pre-emptive determination of the relevances such representations must satisfy. 
Objectivists suppose that the easy part is establishing what ‘subjective 
understandings’ are, whilst phenomenologists know that this is not so. 
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Conclusion 
Attempts to unify sociological thought in a situation of bifurcation are mostly 
undertaken on the basis that an insurgent subjectivism has entailed an illicitly 
reductive treatment of the objectivity of social structures.  Unifications are therefore 
pre-eminently directed toward resisting any kind of reductionism to the ‘subjective’ 
and to make sure that they can account for ‘objective’ features of social life. In 
contrast, we have argued for a more sceptical attitude toward the need for (and 
possibility of) any unification on those terms.  We have tried to show that the concern 
for the objectivity of social structures involves a relentlessly reductive treatment of 
‘the subject’, one constructed more to enable the programme of unification on the 
assumptions of objectivism than to enable even-handed participation from, e.g., 
phenomenology.  Objectivists misunderstand phenomenology as a doctrine that 
argues that the world is experienced as subjective (with the implication that the 
experienced world is divested of objective properties). In contrast, we have tried to 
show that phenomenology’s starting assumption is that the world is experienced as 
objective, i.e., that it is experienced as possessing just those properties – of 
externality, independence, publicity durability, immutability – that objectivists 
treasure.   
If our arguments are correct, then overcoming the subjective-objective dualism is not 
merely a matter of adjusting a picture which has become crooked (an image suggested 
by one unsympathetic reviewer), but of rearranging a whole gallery of them. A typical 
conception of this dualism seems to be that it has split the (whole) picture of reality 
into two parts which now have to be carefully glued together again. Instead, we have 
argued that the initial drawing may have already been flawed.  
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